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DO FOREIGN GREENFIELDS OUTPERFORM FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OR VICE 
VERSA? AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prior studies of the comparative performance of greenfields and acquisitions have advanced 
competing arguments, with some arguing that greenfields should outperform acquisitions because 
acquisitions are costlier to integrate, and others that acquisitions should outperform greenfields 
because greenfields suffer from a liability of newness. Moreover, while the costs of integration 
and the liability of newness are at their greatest during a subsidiary’s first years, prior studies 
have tested their competing arguments on samples containing older subsidiaries. We extend these 
prior studies by (1) developing an institutional theory-based framework that simultaneously 
considers the costs of integration and the liability of newness, (2) recognizing that both types of 
costs vary with the level of subsidiary integration, and (3) focusing on the stage of their life 
during which subsidiaries predominantly incur these costs. To measure subsidiary performance, 
we ask managers of Dutch multinationals how their ex ante performance expectations compare to 
the subsidiary’s ex post performance during its first two years. Analyzing a sample of 191 foreign 
subsidiaries and controlling for entry mode self-selection and other factors, we find that 
acquisitions outperform greenfields at low and intermediate levels of subsidiary integration, but 
that greenfields outperform acquisitions at higher integration levels. 
 
Key words: acquisitions, foreign entry, greenfields, institutional theory, subsidiary integration, 
subsidiary performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Foreign entry mode decisions are an important research topic in the international management 
(IM) literature (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Herrmann and Datta, 2006). One of these decisions 
is the choice by multinational enterprises (MNEs) between greenfield and acquisition entry, the 
so-called establishment mode choice (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). While many studies have 
examined the determinants of this choice, relatively few have examined the comparative 
performance of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries (for reviews, see Datta et al., 2002; Shimizu 
et al., 2004), and those that have done so have advanced competing arguments. Some have 
argued that greenfields should perform better than acquisitions because the latter are costlier to 
integrate (Hennart et al., 1998; Woodcock et al., 1994), while others have argued that greenfields 
should perform worse because they suffer from a liability of newness whereas acquisitions do not 
(Pennings et al., 1994). However, none of these performance studies has considered the costs of 
integration and the liability of newness simultaneously, and none of them has taken into account 
that the magnitude of these two types of costs may vary across subsidiaries, depending on the 
extent to which a subsidiary is integrated into the corporate network of its MNE parent. 
Moreover, while prior studies have focused on the costs of integration and the liability of 
newness, costs that predominantly arise during the first couple of years after a subsidiary has 
been established or acquired (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997), these 
studies have included in their samples many older subsidiaries that were clearly past the stage 
during which such costs arise. Lastly, many studies have not adequately controlled for other 
factors influencing subsidiary performance, including establishment mode self-selection (Shaver, 
1998). Given these limitations, it is hardly surprising that prior studies have obtained mixed 
empirical results, with some finding that greenfields outperform acquisitions (Li, 1995; 
Woodcock et al., 1994), others finding the reverse (Pennings et al., 1994), and still others that 
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they perform equally well (Shaver, 1998; Tsang and Yip, 2007). We therefore think that the time 
is ripe for a closer examination of the comparative performance of greenfield and acquired 
subsidiaries. 
In this paper we use the IM extension of institutional theory (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991) to argue that the level of subsidiary integration, defined as the 
extent to which an MNE parent limits a subsidiary’s ability to make independent decisions, 
determines both the liability of newness faced by greenfield subsidiaries and the integration costs 
incurred by greenfield and acquired subsidiaries, and hence determines their comparative 
performance during their first years. Our starting point is that foreign subsidiaries tend to 
conform to their environment, leading them to incur substantial conformity costs. Specifically, 
we argue that subsidiaries have to respond to both internal conformity pressures from their MNE 
parents and external conformity pressures from the host countries in which they operate (Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). We thus distinguish between internal 
conformity costs, i.e. the costs that subsidiaries incur because they have to adapt to their MNE 
parents, and external conformity costs, i.e. the costs that subsidiaries incur because they have to 
adapt to their host environment. We argue that the internal conformity costs of both greenfields 
and acquisitions increase with the level of subsidiary integration, but that the internal conformity 
costs of acquisitions increase faster because acquisitions are more difficult to integrate. We also 
argue that greenfields, unlike acquisitions, incur substantial external conformity costs because 
they suffer from a liability of newness, and that these costs decrease with the extent to which 
greenfield subsidiaries are integrated by their MNE parents. We combine these insights into 
hypotheses on the relationship between the level of subsidiary integration and the performance of 
subsidiaries during the first two years after they were established or acquired. To measure this 
performance, we asked managers of Dutch MNEs to compare their ex ante performance 
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expectations to the subsidiary’s ex post performance during its first two years. Analyzing a 
sample of 191 foreign subsidiaries, we find that acquisitions outperform greenfields at low and 
intermediate levels of subsidiary integration, but that the situation is reversed at higher 
integration levels. 
Our paper makes several contributions to prior research on the comparative performance of 
greenfields and acquisitions. First, while institutional theory has previously been used to explain 
the choice between joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries and their comparative 
performance (Chung and Beamish, 2005; Davis et al., 2000; Lu, 2002; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; 
Yiu and Makino, 2002), we are the first to apply this theory to the comparative performance of 
greenfields and acquisitions. Second, prior studies of this comparative performance have focused 
on either the costs of integration or the liability of newness, and have assumed these costs to be 
the same for all subsidiaries. We consider both costs simultaneously, and take into account that 
their magnitude depends on the extent to which a subsidiary is integrated by its parent, resulting 
in an integrative framework that better explains the performance of greenfield and acquired 
subsidiaries. Third, in contrast to previous studies, we focus on the performance of subsidiaries 
during their first years, since the costs of integration and the liability of newness predominantly 
arise during this time period. We also control for other factors influencing subsidiary 
performance, including establishment mode self-selection. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no theoretical agreement in the literature on whether greenfield subsidiaries perform 
better or worse than acquired ones. Some studies have argued that greenfields should perform 
better than acquisitions because acquisitions come with existing and possibly duplicate assets, 
and with an established workforce with a different culture, and are hence costlier to integrate and 
control than greenfields (Hennart et al., 1998; Li, 1995; Woodcock et al., 1994). Others, on the 
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other hand, have argued that greenfields should perform worse than acquisitions because 
greenfields are new firms and hence suffer from a liability of newness (Pennings et al., 1994; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). Greenfield subsidiaries are unproven combinations of inputs and lack 
relationships with local stakeholders. Consequently, they are likely to perform relatively poorly 
after their inception (Burgelman, 1985; Caves, 1996). Acquisitions, on the other hand, are going 
concerns with an established network, and hence do not suffer from a liability of newness (Caves, 
1996). As a result, they are more likely to perform satisfactorily than greenfields (Pennings et al., 
1994). 
Besides advancing competing theoretical arguments, prior studies have tested the validity of 
these arguments in sub-optimal ways. Woodcock et al. (1994) analyzed the 1991 financial 
performance of Japanese greenfield and acquired subsidiaries that were more than two years old 
at that time. Nitsch et al. (1996) performed a similar analysis for the years 1992 and 1994. 
However, a solid test of the argument that greenfields outperform acquisitions because 
acquisitions are costlier to integrate, or of the reverse view that acquisitions outperform 
greenfields because greenfields suffer from a liability of newness, requires a focus on the 
performance of subsidiaries over their first years. The reason is that the costs of integration and 
the liability of newness are at their greatest during this time period, and usually diminish quickly 
afterwards (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997). The older the subsidiary, the lower the extent to which its current performance will reflect 
the costs of integration and/or the liability of newness. Similarly, several studies used the exit 
rates of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries as a proxy for the comparative performance of these 
subsidiaries, but included in their samples exits of subsidiaries that had been operational for a 
long time (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Pennings et al., 1994; Li, 1995; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Li and 
Guisinger (1991), for instance, looked at the number of foreign subsidiaries that exited the US 
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between 1978 and 1987, subsidiaries that may have been established or acquired long before 
1978. In Pennings et al. (1994) the median longevity of greenfields was 12.6 years, while that of 
acquisitions was even higher at 17.6 years, indicating that many subsidiaries are quite old when 
they exit. Exits of old subsidiaries are unlikely to be caused by integration-related and/or liability 
of newness-related difficulties, since these difficulties predominantly arise during a subsidiary’s 
first years. Hence, performance indicators based on subsidiary exits do not accurately reflect the 
magnitude of the integration costs and the liability of newness incurred by foreign subsidiaries. 
Moreover, several studies that analyzed subsidiary exit rates defined exits as liquidations and 
sell-offs (Pennings et al., 1994; Li, 1995; Shaver, 1998). Classifying sell-offs as exits, and hence 
as failures, to determine the comparative performance of greenfields and acquisitions is 
problematic for two reasons. First, the fact that a subsidiary is sold by its MNE parent, whether 
early or late, does not necessarily indicate that the subsidiary performed poorly, since parents will 
sell well-performing subsidiaries when they receive a good offer for them (Hennart et al., 2002). 
Second, keeping all other factors (including their performance) constant, acquired subsidiaries are 
more likely to be sold than greenfield subsidiaries. The reason is that acquired subsidiaries have 
already been separated from their owner before, and are hence easier to separate from their 
current parent than greenfield subsidiaries (Hennart et al., 1998, 2002). Hence, the fact that the 
exit rate of greenfield subsidiaries is higher than that of acquired ones does not necessarily 
indicate that greenfields perform worse than acquisitions.      
Another limitation of prior studies is that several of them performed bivariate tests, and hence 
did not control for other factors influencing a subsidiary’s performance besides its establishment 
mode (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). Moreover, while all 
known other studies did control for such factors as the parent’s international and host-country 
experience, the subsidiary’s size, the relatedness of its products to those of its parent, and the 
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cultural distance to the host country, these studies did not, with the sole exception of Shaver 
(1998), control for the fact that the choice between greenfield and acquisition is endogenous and 
self-selected rather than exogenous and random. Given these different methodological 
limitations, it is hardly surprising that prior studies have obtained contradictory empirical results, 
with some finding that greenfields outperform acquisitions (Li, 1995; Woodcock et al., 1994), 
others finding the reverse (Pennings et al., 1994), and still others that they perform equally well 
(Shaver, 1998; Tsang and Yip, 2007). 
Since prior studies have advanced competing theoretical arguments and have tested these 
arguments with sub-optimal research designs, we think that it is time for a closer examination of 
the comparative performance of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries. Below we use the IM 
contribution to institutional theory to extend and integrate the competing theoretical arguments 
put forward by previous research, and to generate new predictions on the performance of 
greenfield and acquired subsidiaries. We subsequently test these predictions on a sample of 
newly-established greenfield and acquired subsidiaries, while carefully controlling for other 
factors influencing subsidiary performance. 
THEORY 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory argues that firms tend to conform to the rules and norms prevailing in their 
environment in order to gain or retain legitimacy and to increase their chances of survival (Child 
and Tsai, 2005; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997). 
Traditional institutional theorists have examined whether and how groups of domestic 
organizations change their structures, decisions, and behaviors due to pressures from their 
external institutional environment (e.g., Holm, 1995; Meyer et al., 1987; Oliver, 1991; Rowan, 
1982; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) were the first to apply 
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institutional theory to MNEs. They observed that MNEs consist of subsidiaries operating in 
different local environments, and that each subsidiary experiences external conformity pressures 
from its respective environment. These pressures are caused by the fact that subsidiaries need to 
conform to local regulations, business practices, and consumer preferences, among others. 
Moreover, as Rosenzweig and Singh argue, subsidiaries not only experience external conformity 
pressures from their environment, but also internal ones from their MNE parents. The latter 
pressures stem from the fact that MNE parents may want to exercise tight control over specific 
subsidiaries. MNE parents will push their subsidiaries to conform to these external and internal 
conformity pressures because they expect these subsidiaries to be more viable once they are 
aligned with their environment. 
The magnitude of the external and internal conformity pressures on a subsidiary depends on 
the extent to which that subsidiary is integrated into the corporate network of its MNE parent 
(Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). A parent will put strong internal 
conformity pressures on a subsidiary when it finds it important to control the activities of the 
subsidiary and to coordinate these activities with its own activities or with those of its other 
subsidiaries, so as to realize synergies in the form of economies of scale or scope (Harzing, 2002; 
Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The realization of such economies requires that the subsidiaries 
involved be tightly integrated by their MNE parents, i.e. be granted limited autonomy, a strategy 
called global integration (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). For example, the optimal exploitation of scale 
economies in manufacturing requires that managers of foreign subsidiaries implement the 
production methods of their MNE parents and make the smallest possible number of adaptations 
to the design of products, since such adaptations lower the size of production runs and hence 
scale economies. Intra-firm shipments of intermediate products should also be determined by 
headquarters, so as to avoid excessive inventories and production delays. 
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A subsidiary will experience strong pressures for external conformity when its success in the 
local market requires a high level of local responsiveness, i.e. when its products need to be 
adapted to local tastes and preferences, or when close ties with local stakeholders are required 
(Miller and Eden, 2006). In such cases MNE parents typically do not integrate the subsidiary but 
instead grant it considerable autonomy in procurement, production, and the use of brand names, 
among others (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Thus, the level of subsidiary integration desired by an 
MNE parent, i.e. the extent to which a parent limits a subsidiary’s ability to make independent 
decisions, will be the outcome of a subsidiary-specific tradeoff between the conflicting forces of 
global integration and local responsiveness (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
Achieving Internal Conformity through Greenfields and Acquisitions 
As stated earlier, several studies have argued that acquisitions will perform worse than 
greenfields because acquisitions are more difficult to integrate and control (Hennart et al., 1998; 
Li, 1995; Woodcock et al., 1994). From an institutional perspective, these studies suggest that 
internal conformity is relatively costly to achieve through acquisitions, owing to the large 
difficulties associated with integrating acquired subsidiaries. Post-acquisition integration implies 
that the acquirer takes away the decision-making power of the acquired subsidiary and replaces 
the systems and practices of the subsidiary with its own (Weber, 1996). This process requires 
interactions between the workforces of the acquirer and the acquired subsidiary, and is likely to 
result in misunderstandings and conflicts between them, even if the integration process is 
carefully planned in advance (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). These 
post-acquisition integration difficulties may stem from differences in management styles and 
organizational or national cultures, from a lack of inter-organizational trust, or from attempts by 
the acquired subsidiary’s management to defend its autonomy (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Datta 
and Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991; Very et al., 1996). Such difficulties result in internal conformity 
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costs that negatively affect the performance of recently-acquired subsidiaries (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Very et al., 1996). 
However, previous studies of the comparative performance of greenfields and acquisitions 
have overlooked the fact that acquirers do not always exercise strong pressures for internal 
conformity on their acquired subsidiaries. Instead of tightly integrating them, acquirers 
sometimes grant their acquired subsidiaries considerable autonomy (Datta, 1991; Uhlenbruck and 
De Castro, 1998), “demanding conformity only on a few elements of organizational structure or 
process” (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991, p. 352), so as to preserve the practices of these 
subsidiaries (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) and to be locally responsive (Datta and Grant, 1990; 
Prahalad and Doz, 1987). In such cases post-acquisition integration difficulties are unlikely to 
occur and the internal conformity costs of acquisitions will be negligible (Davis et al., 2000). In 
sum, the lower the level of post-acquisition integration, the lower the internal conformity costs of 
acquisitions will be, and the less their performance will suffer during the first years after they 
have been made. 
Whereas internal conformity is difficult to achieve through acquisitions, it is relatively easy to 
realize through greenfield investments. As stated earlier, greenfields, in contrast to acquisitions, 
are relatively easy to integrate into an MNE’s corporate network because they do not come with 
existing systems and practices, nor with an established workforce with a different culture 
(Harzing, 2002; Hennart and Park, 1993; Woodcock et al., 1994). Nevertheless, the higher the 
level of integration desired by an MNE parent, the higher the internal conformity costs of 
greenfields will be. The reason is that even though many MNEs striving for tight integration staff 
their foreign greenfields with expatriate managers (Harzing, 2002; Tan and Mahoney, 2006), 
most of the employees of these greenfields remain local workers whose norms, values, and 
preferred routines differ from those of their expatriate superiors (Hofstede, 2001). The more 
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tightly foreign greenfields are integrated into the corporate network of their parents, the more 
likely that these differences in norms, values, and preferred routines will cause internal 
difficulties and hinder the integration process (Neal, 1998). We therefore expect the internal 
conformity costs of greenfields to also increase with the level of integration desired by their 
parents, albeit at a considerably lower rate than the internal conformity costs of acquisitions. 
Achieving External Conformity through Greenfields and Acquisitions 
While some have argued that greenfields perform better than acquisitions, others have argued that 
greenfields perform worse because they suffer from a liability of newness whereas acquisitions 
do not (Pennings et al., 1994). Besides suffering from a liability of newness, foreign greenfields 
also suffer from a liability of foreignness, meaning that they incur costs not incurred by local 
firms (Hymer, 1976; Luo, 1999; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). These costs arise because 
greenfield subsidiaries typically lack knowledge of the local environment in which they operate, 
or because they suffer from discrimination from government officials or local customers (Zaheer 
and Mosakowski, 1997). Acquisitions, on the other hand, are far less likely to suffer from a 
liability of foreignness, as they come with local market knowledge, solid ties with government 
officials, and locally-accepted products and brand names. 
From an institutional perspective, recently-established greenfields are not yet accepted by 
their external environment. In order to become accepted, their management needs to spend time 
and resources on becoming familiar with local rules, norms, and consumer preferences, and on 
developing sustainable relationships with local suppliers and government officials. Hence, 
greenfields incur substantial costs to achieve external conformity. These costs will predominantly 
arise during the first years of a greenfield’s existence, since it will gradually obtain more 
knowledge of the local market, and since local stakeholders will gradually become accustomed to 
its presence and will start to perceive it as legitimate (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). 
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Acquisitions, on the other hand, do not generally incur external conformity costs after they have 
been made, as they are going concerns with a proven track record, industry and local market 
knowledge, and established ties with suppliers, customers, and government agencies (Caves, 
1996; Pennings et al., 1994). In other words, acquisitions are already largely aligned with, and 
accepted by, the external environment in which they operate (Harzing, 2002). 
While previous research has implicitly assumed that the costs of achieving external 
conformity will be the same for all greenfields, we contend that these costs will decrease with the 
extent to which greenfield subsidiaries are integrated by their parents. Tightly-integrated 
greenfields either sell standardized products for which customer tastes are universal, or sell 
intermediate or finished goods to their parents or to sister affiliates. Consequently, such 
greenfields do not need to acquire knowledge of local tastes and do not need to be firmly-
embedded in local networks. Quasi-autonomous greenfields, on the other hand, typically 
manufacture products that are tailored to local tastes, and more often rely on local suppliers and 
distributors. Such greenfields therefore need to acquire intimate knowledge of the local market 
and need to develop close relationships with local firms (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Hence, 
tightly-integrated greenfields will incur lower external conformity costs than quasi-autonomous 
ones (cf. Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006). In contrast to previous research, we thus expect the 
external conformity costs incurred by greenfields to decrease with the extent to which they are 
integrated by their MNE parents. 
INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
We have argued that the internal conformity costs incurred by both acquisitions and greenfields 
increase with the extent to which these two subsidiary types are integrated by their parents, but 
that these costs increase faster for acquisitions than for greenfields. We have also argued that the 
external conformity costs incurred by acquisitions are negligible, while those incurred by 
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greenfields decrease with the extent to which greenfields are integrated by their parents. Figure 1 
depicts these relationships graphically by plotting the conformity costs incurred by greenfields 
and acquisitions as a function of the level of subsidiary integration. Greenfield and acquired 
subsidiaries incurring these conformity costs will experience a lower performance, in particular 
during their first years. The higher the total conformity costs incurred by a subsidiary, the lower 
its performance. By jointly considering the depicted relationships, Figure 1 thus allows us to 
hypothesize on the relationship between the level of integration of greenfield and acquired 
subsidiaries and their relative performance. 
Figure 1 shows that the total conformity costs of acquired subsidiaries – which consist only of 
internal conformity costs – increase with the level of integration (line D). This suggests that, 
keeping all other factors constant, integration will have a negative effect on the performance of 
acquired subsidiaries. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a: Subsidiary integration has a negative effect on the performance of 
acquisitions. 
The effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields, on the other hand, is 
less clear-cut. Whereas their internal conformity costs increase (line A), their external conformity 
costs decrease with the level of integration (line B). Unfortunately, institutional theory does not 
indicate how fast the internal conformity costs incurred by greenfields increase with the level of 
subsidiary integration, nor how fast their external conformity costs decrease. Consequently, it is a 
priori unclear how integration will affect the total conformity costs incurred by greenfields, and 
hence whether integration will have a negative, a non-significant, or a positive effect on the 
performance of greenfields. To facilitate its interpretation, we have constructed Figure 1 so that 
the increase in the internal conformity costs of greenfields (line A) exactly offsets the decrease in 
their external conformity costs (line B), suggesting that the total conformity costs incurred by 
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greenfields are the same at all levels of integration (line C), and hence that integration will have 
no impact on the performance of greenfields. However, since we do not know the exact slopes of 
the lines A and B, the impact of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields is 
actually an empirical question. 
Although we do not know exactly how the total conformity costs incurred by greenfields 
behave as a function of the level of integration, we do know that these costs will in any case 
increase less rapidly with the level of integration than the total conformity costs of acquisitions. 
This is because the internal conformity costs incurred by greenfields (line A) increase less 
rapidly with the level of integration than the internal conformity costs incurred by acquisitions 
(line D) and, moreover, because the external conformity costs incurred by greenfields decrease 
(rather than increase) with the level of integration (line B). Consequently, integration is likely to 
have a differential effect on the performance of greenfields and acquisitions. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1b: The effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields differs 
from the effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of acquisitions. 
Figure 1 also shows that at low levels of subsidiary integration greenfields incur substantial 
external conformity costs and no internal conformity costs, whereas acquisitions incur neither 
external nor internal conformity costs. This suggests that at low levels of subsidiary integration 
greenfields should perform worse than acquisitions. That is: 
Hypothesis 2a: Acquisitions perform better than greenfields at low levels of subsidiary 
integration. 
However, Figure 1 also makes clear that the extent to which acquisitions outperform 
greenfields decreases as the level of subsidiary integration increases. This is because, as stated 
earlier, the internal conformity costs of acquisitions (line D) increase faster with the level of 
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integration than those of greenfields (line A) and because the external conformity costs of 
greenfields decrease with the level of integration (line B). Hence: 
Hypothesis 2b: The extent to which acquisitions outperform greenfields decreases with the 
level of subsidiary integration. 
Note that our integrative framework does not indicate whether greenfields will eventually 
start to outperform acquisitions and, if so, at what level of integration this will happen. Figure 1 
suggests that the total conformity costs of acquisitions remain lower than those of greenfields at 
intermediate levels of integration and only exceed them at high levels of integration (i.e., to the 
right of the vertical dashed line). Hence, Figure 1 suggests that greenfields only outperform 
acquisitions at high levels of integration. However, theoretically it is also possible that 
greenfields will already start to outperform acquisitions at intermediate levels of integration, or 
that greenfields will continue to perform worse than acquisitions, even at high levels of 
integration. The reason for this theoretical ambiguity is that institutional theory, as stated earlier, 
does not allow us to specify the exact slopes of the lines A, B, C, and D. Institutional theory only 
predicts that line D (representing the internal conformity costs of acquisitions) will increase faster 
than line A (reflecting the internal conformity costs of greenfields), and that line B (representing 
the external conformity costs of greenfields) will decrease. Hence, whether greenfields will start 
to outperform acquisitions at a certain level of subsidiary integration is also an empirical 
question. 
METHODOLOGY 
We collected our data from secondary sources (to be specified below) and by surveying senior 
executives of 821 Dutch firms. While most of these executives were members of the management 
board of Dutch MNE parents, some of them were directors of the Netherlands-based divisions of 
these parents, since some large Dutch parents allow their divisions to independently make foreign 
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investments. Netherlands-based divisions and Netherlands-based subsidiaries of foreign MNEs 
were excluded from the survey. All firms registered in the Netherlands are required by law to file 
accurate data with the Chamber of Commerce, and this data is compiled in the REACH database, 
which we used to obtain the names of the managers and their firms. 
The questionnaire used was first evaluated by several international management scholars, and 
then pre-tested on five experienced managers whose firms had made foreign greenfield 
investments and/or acquisitions in recent years. These pre-tests resulted in several changes in the 
wording of questions. In the questionnaire we asked managers to provide data on one of their 
firm’s foreign greenfield or acquired subsidiaries, or on both subsidiary types. To ensure the 
reliability of this data we structured the questionnaire in such a way that managers would only 
provide data on a subsidiary if (1) their firm was responsible for the subsidiary, (2) the subsidiary 
had been established or acquired in recent years, and (3) the managers had been personally 
involved in its establishment mode decision. Appendix A lists the questionnaire items used in this 
study. 
After sending the questionnaire and a subsequent reminder by mail, we obtained a 19.2% 
response rate (cf. Harzing, 2002: 20%; Luo, 1999: 19.2%), with most respondents being CEOs, 
CFOs, and Directors of Corporate Development. Some respondents worked for the same firm, 
but they usually provided data on different subsidiaries. In the very few cases where respondents 
provided data on the same subsidiary, we followed Very et al. (1997) and averaged their 
responses into a single observation. We received complete data on all questionnaire items listed 
in Appendix A for 235 foreign subsidiaries of 150 MNEs. We excluded 44 subsidiaries from our 
sample; 32 because they had been established or acquired by their MNE parents in either 2002 or 
2003, which we deemed to be too recently for their performance estimates to be reliable, given 
that the survey was conducted in mid-2003; and 12 for reasons mentioned below. The final 
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sample consists of 191 subsidiaries, 91 greenfields and 100 acquisitions, established or acquired 
by 130 Dutch MNEs in 46 countries over the 1995-2001 period.  
To assess whether the 130 MNEs in our sample are representative of the population of Dutch 
MNEs, we examined whether the size of these 130 MNEs differed from the size of the 691 
MNEs that provided no or unusable subsidiary data. T-tests that corrected for unequal variances 
across groups indicated that the MNEs in our sample on average had higher sales (2.72 vs. 1.41 
billion euros; p < 0.10, two-tailed) and more employees (11.400 vs. 3500; p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
than the 691 other MNEs. Hence, our findings primarily apply to subsidiaries of large Dutch 
MNEs. 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Subsidiary performance. Because accounting data on the performance of 
subsidiaries located in many different countries is generally unavailable and, even if available, 
often non-comparable across countries because of differences in national accounting systems, we 
used survey data to measure a subsidiary’s performance. Specifically, we asked managers to rate 
on 7-point Likert-type scales (1) the sales level, (2) the market share, (3) the profit level, and (4) 
the overall performance of the subsidiary during the first two years after it had been established 
or acquired, compared to expectations at the time of its inception. While the correlations between 
the items sales level, market share, and overall performance all exceeded 0.6, this was not the 
case for some of the correlations between these three items and the item profit level. We therefore 
excluded the latter item from our performance measure. Since the three remaining items formed a 
reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88), we averaged their scores into a composite measure of 
subsidiary performance. Previous studies have used similar instruments to measure a subsidiary’s 
performance (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2005; Luo, 1999), and have shown that such instruments 
correlate well with performance measures based on archival data (e.g., Geringer and Hebert, 
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1991; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987). Because managers’ expectations of the performance 
of a subsidiary will depend in part on the amount of efforts and resources that were spent in 
establishing or acquiring the subsidiary, our performance measure in essence captures the 
effectiveness of the subsidiary from the point of view of parent executives. 
In line with Morosini et al. (1998), we asked how the subsidiary performed during the first 
two years after it had been established or acquired. There are two reasons for adopting this 
particular time frame. First, as stated earlier, subsidiaries incur most internal and external 
conformity costs during their first years (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997). Second, in the longer run the level of subsidiary integration chosen should yield benefits 
rather than conformity costs. Consequently, the longer the time period studied, the more likely 
that a subsidiary’s performance will reflect the benefits associated with the chosen level of 
integration rather than the conformity costs associated with it. In sum, a two-year time window 
makes it possible to perform a stronger and cleaner test of our conformity cost-based hypotheses. 
We asked managers to rate the initial performance of the subsidiary compared to their ex ante 
expectations. This raises two potential concerns. First, managers may have inaccurate 
recollections of the expected and actual performance of a subsidiary. However, since the 
establishment of a foreign subsidiary is an important event, and since our respondents were 
personally involved in the decision leading to this event, they are likely to have had good recall 
of their ex ante performance expectations and the subsidiary’s ex post performance (Schwenk, 
1985, 1988). A second potential concern is that managers may be emotionally involved with a 
subsidiary, and may hence report biased estimates of its performance. However, since our 
respondents did not run the subsidiaries themselves but were employed at headquarters, and since 
they generally worked for large firms with many foreign subsidiaries, their level of emotional 
involvement with the focal subsidiary is likely to have been moderate. Consequently, they are 
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unlikely to have reported biased estimates of the subsidiary’s performance (Huber and Power, 
1985). 
Independent variable 1: Establishment mode. The first key independent variable is the 
establishment mode of the focal subsidiary. Based on the questionnaire responses, we coded this 
variable 1 for greenfield subsidiaries and 0 for acquired ones. Following Shaver (1998), we 
excluded from our sample 12 greenfield subsidiaries that were co-owned and co-managed by 
local partners. We did so because the external conformity costs incurred by such subsidiaries are 
likely to be much lower than those incurred by wholly-owned greenfields, as local joint venture 
partners usually contribute local market knowledge and a local network.  
Independent variable 2: Subsidiary integration. As stated earlier, MNEs that tightly integrate 
their subsidiaries grant them limited autonomy. Since this level of autonomy is hard to measure 
from secondary sources, we followed Datta (1991) and Weber (1996), among others, and 
assessed it through the questionnaire. We asked managers to indicate how much autonomy their 
management team intended to give the focal subsidiary in 12 functional areas, such as 
procurement, the production/service process, pricing, and job design, at the time it was 
established or acquired. We reversed the scores on the 12 items so that higher scores reflected 
tighter integration, and averaged the scores on 11 of the reverse-coded items into a composite 
measure (Cronbach's alpha = 0.87). The item raising capital was excluded because it correlated 
poorly with most of the other items and with the composite measure. We asked for the planned 
rather than for the realized level of autonomy in each functional area because conformity costs 
are driven by integration attempts. The realized level of autonomy does not adequately reflect 
these attempts because MNE parents do not always succeed in their integration attempts. 
Assuming that managers generally execute their integration plans, the planned level of autonomy 
better reflects these attempts. Moreover, by asking for the planned rather than for the realized 
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level of autonomy, we eliminate the risk that our results are influenced by reverse causality. 
Specifically, our approach rules out the possibility that a negative effect of integration on 
subsidiary performance is caused by the fact that poorly-performing subsidiaries are integrated 
more tightly. 
Control variables. We control for several other factors potentially affecting foreign subsidiary 
performance. First, we control for an MNE’s international experience, as subsidiaries of MNEs 
with extensive international experience may perform better than those of MNEs with little such 
experience (Li, 1995). Following Kogut and Singh (1988), we measured an MNE’s international 
experience by the log of the number of foreign countries in which the MNE had subsidiaries. This 
number was obtained from the responding MNEs’ annual reports and corporate websites. 
We also control for an MNE’s host-country experience, since subsidiaries operating in 
countries with which their MNE parents are familiar may perform better than subsidiaries of 
MNE parents without host-country experience (Miller and Eden, 2006). We obtained data on an 
MNE’s host-country experience by asking survey respondents to indicate whether their firm had 
previously been active in the country entered through (1) licensing agreements, (2) sales agents, 
(3) sales subsidiaries, (4) manufacturing or service subsidiaries, or (5) other means. As each of 
these experiences increases an MNE’s knowledge of the host country to a different extent 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), we assigned different values to them. Specifically, the first four 
experience types were given the values of 1 through 4, respectively. Almost all experiences in the 
fifth category involved direct exports to the host country and were assigned a value of 2. Our 
measure of an MNE’s host-country experience is the sum of the values assigned to the different 
experience types. 
Third, we control for the extent to which the activities of the focal subsidiary are related to 
those of its parent. The less related these activities are, the less subsidiaries can draw on the 
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product-specific knowledge of their parents, and hence the more poorly they may perform (Li, 
1995; Shaver, 1998). To measure the relatedness of the focal subsidiary’s activities to those of its 
parent, we asked respondents for a description of the subsidiary’s main products/services and 
compared it to REACH’s description of the parent’s main and secondary activities. We created 
two dummy variables, i.e. ‘subsidiary performs related activities’ and ‘subsidiary performs 
unrelated activities’. The first dummy takes a value of 1 when the subsidiary’s main 
products/services were the same as its parent’s secondary products/services, while the second 
takes a value of 1 when the subsidiary’s activities/services differed from both its parent’s main 
and secondary products/services. When both dummy variables have a value of 0, the main 
products/services of the subsidiary were the same as those of its parent. 
Fourth, we control for subsidiary size, since MNE parents are generally more dependent on 
large subsidiaries than on small ones (Prahalad and Doz, 1987), and may hence pay more 
attention and offer more support to large subsidiaries, thereby increasing the performance of such 
subsidiaries (Bouquet, 2005; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). We therefore included in our 
models the log of the respondent’s rating of the size of the subsidiary compared to the size of its 
parent. 
Fifth, we control for the level of competition faced by the focal subsidiary, as fiercer 
competition may negatively affect a subsidiary’s performance (Miller and Eden, 2006). In line 
with the two-year time frame of our performance measure, we asked respondents to rate on a 7-
point Likert-type scale how much competition the focal subsidiary encountered during its first 
two years. 
Similarly, the state of the local and global economy may also affect the performance of 
foreign subsidiaries. We therefore asked respondents to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale how 
good or bad the economic conditions for the subsidiary were during its first two years. 
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Seventh, we include the Kogut and Singh (1988) index to control for the cultural distance 
between the Netherlands and each host country. The larger the cultural distance between 
countries, the more dissimilar their norms, values, customs, and business practices (Hofstede, 
2001; Kogut and Singh, 1988). MNE subsidiaries located in culturally-distant countries may 
therefore find it difficult to successfully operate in such countries and may hence exhibit a lower 
performance than those located in culturally-similar countries. On the other hand, an MNE’s 
business practices may be especially valuable to subsidiaries located in culturally-distant 
countries precisely because these practices are so different from local ones. Subsidiaries in 
culturally-distant countries may therefore be especially successful (Morosini et al., 1998). 
Finally, since the extent to which subsidiaries are integrated, their establishment mode, and 
their performance may vary across industries, we include 12 industry dummies in our models, 
using agriculture and horticulture as the baseline industry. To classify MNE parents into 
industries, we used the BIK code, the Dutch equivalent of the American SIC code, of the main 
activities of each parent as reported in the REACH database. 
Common Method Bias 
Because the data on both our dependent variable (subsidiary performance) and several 
independent variables come from the questionnaire, our results may be subject to a common 
method bias. However, there are several reasons why our results are unlikely to be subject to such 
a bias. First, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) recommendations to use temporal and 
psychological separations in our survey. We created temporal separations by (i) including the 
items measuring the key concepts non-consecutively, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
managers respond to each set of key items without recalling their responses to prior sets of key 
items, and by (ii) asking for planned integration levels and realized performance levels, forcing 
respondents to think of different time periods. We also created a psychological separation by not 
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revealing to respondents the exact goal of the survey, thereby reducing the perceived relevance of 
prior items. These separations greatly reduce the risk of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Second, although both the level of integration of the subsidiary and its establishment mode 
were obtained from the questionnaire, these two variables were interacted to test our hypotheses. 
Interaction effects are unlikely to be subject to common-method bias, as respondents are unlikely 
to consciously theorize moderated relationships when they fill out a survey (Brockner et al., 
1997; Kotabe et al., 2003), especially when they do not know the exact goal of the survey, as in 
our case. Third, following Kotabe et al. (2003), we performed a principal-components factor 
analysis on all Likert-type questionnaire items used to construct our perceptual measures. This 
analysis did not yield one overarching factor, but five separate ones, suggesting the absence of 
common method bias (Harman, 1967). 
Method 
Since MNE managers deliberately select what they consider to be the best-performing 
establishment mode on the basis of parent, subsidiary, industry, and host-country characteristics, 
we employed Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure to control for establishment mode self-
selection (Shaver, 1998). Using STATA 9.1, we first estimated a binary probit model of the 
determinants of the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry to generate a correction term 
for self-selection (lambda), and then employed OLS regression analysis to regress lambda and the 
other independent variables on subsidiary performance. Using STATA’s “cluster” subcommand, 
we adjusted the standard errors of both the first and second-stage models for the fact that several 
subsidiaries in our sample belonged to the same MNE parent (see Xu et al., 2004 for further 
details of this procedure). 
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RESULTS 
Table I reports the results of the first-stage probit model that we ran to generate lambda. The 
variables included in this model are similar to those included in prior studies on the choice 
between greenfield and acquisition entry (for reviews, see Datta et al., 2002; Shimizu et al., 
2004). The variables that are not included in the second-stage model are operationalized as 
follows. An MNE’s level of diversification was measured through the log of the number of 4-
digit BIK codes in which it operated according to the REACH database. MNE type is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the subsidiary’s parent was into either services or wholesale trade, and 0 if it 
was into manufacturing. The other variables solely included in the first-stage model are based on 
single questionnaire items measured on 7-point Likert-type scales, except for ‘host-government 
restrictions on acquisitions and incentives to choose greenfields’, which is a composite measure 
consisting of two items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66). The results of the first-stage model are largely 
consistent with those of previous research (see Datta et al., 2002; Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Tables II and III depict the regional distribution of the subsidiaries comprising our sample 
and the industry distribution of their MNE parents, respectively, as well as the mean scores of our 
key variables by region and by parent industry. Table IV contains the descriptive statistics of the 
variables included in the second-stage OLS regression models and the correlations between these 
variables. Except for the inevitably high correlation between the establishment mode dummy and 
lambda (r = 0.77), none of the correlations between the independent variables exceed 0.32, 
suggesting the absence of multicollinearity. This is confirmed by the fact that the largest variance 
inflation factor in our full model was 6.19, which is lower than the multicollinearity threshold of 
10 (Neter et al., 1996). 
Table V displays the results of the second-stage regression analyses that we ran to explore 
how a subsidiary’s establishment mode and its level of integration influence its performance over 
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the first two years. The establishment mode dummy, which is equal to one for greenfields, has a 
significantly negative effect on subsidiary performance in Model 1 (p < 0.10, two-tailed), 
indicating that when the level of subsidiary integration is ignored, greenfield subsidiaries perform 
somewhat worse than acquired ones, even after controlling for establishment mode self-selection. 
Specifically, the regression coefficient of the establishment mode dummy shows a performance 
difference of 0.72 (on a 7-point scale). However, Model 2 shows that once we control for the 
level of integration desired by the subsidiary’s parent, the effect of establishment mode becomes 
non-significant, indicating that greenfield and acquired subsidiaries perform equally well. The 
coefficient of the level of subsidiary integration is significantly negative (p < 0.05) in Model 2, 
implying that foreign subsidiaries perform more poorly when their parents integrate them more 
tightly. 
Hypothesis 1a proposed that the effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of 
acquisitions would be negative, and hypothesis 1b that this effect would be significantly different 
from the effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields. We tested these 
hypotheses in Model 3 by including an interaction term between subsidiary integration and 
establishment mode. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we followed Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, 
p. 33) and centered the subsidiary integration measure before we interacted it with the 
establishment mode dummy. Note that the interaction term is composed of an ordinal variable 
(subsidiary integration) and a dummy variable (establishment mode). In such cases the regression 
coefficient of the ordinal variable indicates the effect of that variable on the dependent variable 
when the dummy variable is zero, while the coefficient of the interaction term indicates the extent 
to which the effect of the ordinal variable differs between the two dummy categories (Jaccard and 
Turrisi, 2003, p. 34). Since the establishment mode dummy is coded zero for acquisitions in 
Model 3, the coefficient of subsidiary integration in that model thus indicates how subsidiary 
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integration affects the performance of acquisitions. In line with hypothesis 1a, this coefficient is 
significantly negative (p<0.001), indicating that integration harms the performance of 
acquisitions. Furthermore, the significant interaction effect in Model 3 (p<0.05) indicates that the 
negative effect of integration on the performance of acquisitions is significantly different from 
the effect of integration on the performance of greenfields. We thus also find support for 
hypothesis 1b. Because we centered the subsidiary integration measure, the coefficient of the 
establishment mode dummy in Model 3 indicates the extent to which the performance of 
greenfields and acquisitions differs at the mean value of subsidiary integration. This coefficient is 
non-significant, meaning that greenfield and acquired subsidiaries perform equally well at 
average levels of integration. 
As stated earlier, the exact effect of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields 
is theoretically ambiguous and hence an empirical question. In order to gain insight into this 
effect, we followed Jaccard and Turrisi (2003, p. 34) and reverse coded the establishment mode 
dummy in Model 4, so that the dummy is coded zero for greenfields in that model. We then 
interacted the reverse-coded dummy with our centered subsidiary integration measure. As a 
result, the coefficient of subsidiary integration in Model 4 indicates how subsidiary integration 
influences the performance of greenfields. This coefficient turns out to be negative but non-
significant, indicating that integration does not substantially affect the performance of 
greenfields. It can thus be concluded that the increase in the internal conformity costs of 
greenfields at higher levels of integration is offset by the decrease in their external conformity 
costs. Hence, the horizontal line C in Figure 1 seems to adequately represent empirical reality. 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that acquisitions would outperform greenfields at low levels of 
subsidiary integration, and hypothesis 2b that the extent to which acquisitions outperform 
greenfields would decrease at higher levels of integration. To test these hypotheses, we used the 
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results of Model 3 to plot the relationship between the level of subsidiary integration and the 
performance of both greenfields and acquisitions, keeping all control variables (including 
lambda) constant at their sample mean. As shown in Figure 2, acquisitions indeed perform better 
than greenfields at low levels of subsidiary integration, and the extent to which acquisitions 
outperform greenfields indeed decreases with the level of integration. We thus find support for 
both hypothesis 2a and 2b. Figure 2 not only shows that the extent to which acquisitions 
outperform greenfields decreases with the level of integration, but also that greenfields at a 
certain level of integration start to outperform acquisitions. Follow-up calculations showed that 
this level of integration equals 3.64, which corresponds to a moderately high level of integration, 
given that the integration items were measured on 5-point scales. 
We assessed the robustness of our regression estimates in two ways. First, instead of 
averaging the scores on the three performance items into a summated scale, we performed a 
principal-components factor analysis on these items (resulting in a single factor) and used their 
factor loadings to compute factor scores of subsidiary performance. When we used this 
alternative performance measure, we obtained results highly similar to those reported in Table V. 
Second, we ran our models for each performance item separately. The results were largely in line 
with those reported in Table V, albeit the p-values of the variables of interest were in some cases 
somewhat higher. 
DISCUSSION 
MNEs can enter foreign countries through greenfield investments or through acquisitions. While 
many studies have examined the determinants of this strategic choice, relatively few have 
examined its performance consequences, and those that have done so have made opposing 
predictions. Some studies have argued that acquisitions should perform worse than greenfields 
because acquisitions are costlier to integrate (Hennart et al., 1998; Woodcock et al., 1994), and 
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others that greenfields should perform worse than acquisitions because greenfields suffer from a 
liability of newness (Pennings et al., 1994), but none of them has considered both arguments 
simultaneously. Moreover, prior studies have tested these arguments in sub-optimal ways by 
including in their samples subsidiaries that were past the stage of their life during which they 
incur integration costs and liabilities of newness, and by failing to control for other factors 
affecting subsidiary performance, particularly establishment mode self-selection.  
In this paper we sought to extend these prior studies by integrating their competing arguments 
into an overarching institutional theory-based framework, and by focusing on the time period 
during which the costs of integration and the liability of newness arise. Specifically, we proposed 
that the costs of integration are costs that foreign subsidiaries incur when they have to adapt to 
their MNE parents (internal conformity costs), while the liability of newness represents costs that 
subsidiaries incur when they have to adapt to their host-country environment (external 
conformity costs). Whereas prior studies assumed that the magnitude of these two types of costs 
depends exclusively on whether the subsidiary was established through greenfield or through 
acquisition, we have argued and shown that the level of these costs, and hence the comparative 
performance of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries during their first years, also hinges on the 
extent to which these subsidiaries are integrated by their MNE parents. We measured subsidiary 
performance by asking managers of Dutch MNEs how their ex ante performance expectations 
compared to the subsidiary’s ex post performance during its first two years. Analyzing this 
measure of performance for 191 Dutch foreign subsidiaries and controlling for establishment 
mode self-selection and other factors, we found that, keeping constant the level of subsidiary 
integration, greenfield and acquired subsidiaries perform equally well, suggesting that their total 
conformity costs are comparable. However, once we allowed for variations in the level of 
subsidiary integration, we found that the performance of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries 
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differs systematically, with acquisitions outperforming greenfields at low and intermediate levels 
of subsidiary integration, and greenfields outperforming acquisitions at higher integration levels. 
Assuming that the costs that greenfield and acquired subsidiaries incur after their turbulent first 
two years are, on average, the same, these results suggest that MNEs intending to tightly integrate 
a specific foreign subsidiary are better off establishing it from scratch, and that those intending to 
grant it much autonomy are better off acquiring it from another firm. In other words, our study 
suggests that there is no single optimal establishment mode, but that the optimal mode is 
contingent upon the extent to which an MNE parent plans to integrate the focal subsidiary. 
Like any empirical study, ours has some limitations that may form the basis for future 
research. As stated earlier, we looked at the performance of subsidiaries over their first years 
because subsidiaries incur most conformity costs during that time period. However, subsidiaries 
may occasionally incur internal and external conformity costs in a later stage of their life. For 
instance, parents sometimes grant their acquired subsidiaries a grace period of several years 
before they start to put internal conformity pressures on them. Similarly, environmental changes 
or corporate scandals may undermine the external legitimacy of mature foreign subsidiaries, 
forcing these subsidiaries to incur new external conformity costs. Future studies could focus on 
these conformity costs occasionally incurred by mature subsidiaries. 
A second disadvantage of our two-year time window is that it does not capture the benefits 
associated with different levels of subsidiary integration, since these benefits typically take 
several years to be realized. Future studies could therefore examine how the benefits of greenfield 
and acquired subsidiaries change as a function of the level of subsidiary integration, using longer-
run performance estimates. Such studies would further increase our understanding of the 
comparative performance of greenfield and acquired subsidiaries. 
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Another potential limitation of our study is that we do not measure the internal and external 
conformity costs incurred by foreign subsidiaries directly, but instead use the performance of 
these subsidiaries during their first two years as an aggregate proxy for these two types of costs. 
However, this need not be a problem. For instance, even though transaction costs play a key role 
in transaction cost theory, these costs have seldom been measured directly (for notable 
exceptions, see Benito et al., 2005, and Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999), suggesting that the 
central concepts of solid theories do not necessarily need to be operationalized in order to test the 
validity of these theories. Nevertheless, future studies could develop direct and separate measures 
of the internal and external conformity costs incurred by greenfield and acquired subsidiaries, so 
as to examine whether these costs indeed vary with the level of subsidiary integration in the way 
we propose (see Figure 1). 
The conformity costs incurred by subsidiaries may also depend on other factors besides the 
level of subsidiary integration. One of these factors is the speed at which MNE parents integrate 
their subsidiaries. Subsidiaries that are integrated quickly during the first few months may for 
instance incur either less or more internal conformity costs than subsidiaries that are integrated 
gradually over a course of two years. Conformity costs may also vary across different types of 
acquisitions. For example, parents sometimes take a minority stake in foreign firms before 
acquiring them. Such staged takeovers may result in lower internal and external conformity costs 
than takeovers of firms in which acquirers do not take a minority stake first. Similarly, hostile 
acquisitions are likely to cause higher internal conformity costs than friendly ones. We were 
unable to control for these potentially important factors, but future studies could shed more light 
on their role. 
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Lastly, our sample consists of foreign subsidiaries of Dutch firms whose average size was 
rather large. We therefore urge scholars to examine the extent to which our findings are 
generalizable to foreign subsidiaries of non-Dutch or smaller firms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to both institutional theory research in IM and to 
the debate on the comparative performance of foreign entry modes. Prior IM studies based on 
institutional theory have made some specific assumptions about the extent to which greenfield 
and acquired subsidiaries are integrated by their MNE parents, leading them to make 
questionable predictions about the costs that these subsidiaries incur in conforming to their 
internal and external environment. Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) assumed that MNEs integrate 
all their greenfields tightly and grant all their acquisitions considerable autonomy, leading them 
to argue that acquisitions incur lower internal conformity costs than greenfields. Harzing (2002), 
on the other hand, implicitly assumed that MNEs integrate all their greenfields and acquisitions to 
the same extent, leading her to advance the competing view that acquisitions incur higher internal 
conformity costs than greenfields because acquisitions are more difficult to integrate, and that all 
greenfields incur the same external conformity costs. We have relaxed these assumptions by 
allowing the level of subsidiary integration to vary across individual subsidiaries, resulting in 
new insights into the comparative internal and external conformity costs incurred by greenfields 
and acquisitions. Specifically, our findings support the idea that the internal conformity costs of 
acquisitions increase faster with the level of subsidiary integration than those of greenfields, and 
that the external conformity costs of greenfields decrease with the level of subsidiary integration, 
causing the impact of a subsidiary’s establishment mode on its performance to be more subtle 
than previously assumed. 
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We also resolve the controversy in the entry mode literature over whether greenfield or 
acquisition entry results in better performance. Prior studies have advanced competing theoretical 
arguments and have obtained divergent results, with some finding that greenfields consistently 
outperform acquisitions (Li, 1995; Woodcock et al., 1994), others finding the reverse (Pennings 
et al., 1994), and still others that both subsidiary types perform equally well (Shaver, 1998; Tsang 
and Yip, 2007). We find that it all depends on the level of subsidiary integration, i.e. on the extent 
to which an MNE parent limits a subsidiary’s decision making power in different functional 
areas. Specifically, we find that acquisitions outperform greenfields at low to intermediate levels 
of subsidiary integration, that both subsidiary types perform equally well at moderately high 
levels of integration, and that greenfields outperform acquisitions at higher integration levels. 
These findings indicate that the level of subsidiary integration is a key determinant of the 
comparative performance of foreign entry modes, and should hence be taken into account in 
future entry mode research. We recommend that future IM studies of the relationship between 
parents and subsidiaries within MNE networks, such as those of intra-MNE knowledge transfers, 
also pay attention to this level of integration, so as to further increase our understanding of the 
role of this factor in international business. 
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APPENDIX A: Questionnaire Items Used 
 
Subsidiary performance: How did greenfield A [venture B] perform on each of the 
following aspects during the first two years after it became operational [after the acquisition]? 
(compared to expectations at the time of entry) 
• sales level 
• market share 
• overall performance 
(7-point Likert-type scales ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’) 
 
Subsidiary integration: The degree of subsidiary autonomy is the extent to which a 
subsidiary’s management team is free to run the venture at its own discretion. How much 
autonomy did your management team intend to give greenfield A [venture B] at the time it was 
established [acquired]? Please answer this question for each of the following functions that apply: 
• procurement 
• product/service design 
• R&D 
• production/service process 
• the use of brand names 
• packaging 
• pricing 
• advertising and sales promotion 
• the design of reward systems 
• job design 
• selection and training of employees 
(5-point Likert-type scales ranging from ‘very little autonomy intended’ to ‘very much autonomy 
intended’. For each item we also provided a separate category ‘no intentions in advance’. We 
reversed the scores on the items.) 
 
MNE’s host-country experience: In which way(s) has your entity been active in country X 
before greenfield A [venture B] was established [acquired]? Please tick all forms of involvement 
that apply. 
___ by means of licensing agreements 
___ by means of one or more sales agents 
___ by means of one or more sales subsidiaries 
___ by means of one or more manufacturing or service subsidiaries 
___ otherwise, viz. ______________________________________ 
 
Subsidiary size: What was the [planned] relative size (in terms of the number of employees) 
of venture B [greenfield A] compared to the size of your entity at the time of the acquisition [at 
the time greenfield A was established]? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘very small’ to ‘very large’) 
 
Competition: How much competition did greenfield A [venture B] encounter during the first 
two years after it became operational [after the acquisition]? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘very little’ to ‘very much’) 
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Economic conditions: How were the economic conditions for greenfield A [venture B] 
during the first two years after it became operational [after the acquisition]? 
(7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’) 
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Table I. First-stage probit estimates of the determinants of establishment mode choice 
 
Variable Coefficient 
MNE’s level of diversification 
 
0.19
(0.16)
 
MNE’s host-country experience 
 
-0.05
(0.04)
 
MNE’s greenfield experience 
 
0.20
(0.06)
*** 
MNE’s acquisition experience 
 
-0.22
(0.06)
*** 
MNE type 0.09
(0.19)
 
 
Amount of technological knowledge to be transferred to the subsidiary 0.13
(0.06)
* 
Subsidiary performs related activities 
 
-0.01
(0.33)
 
Subsidiary performs unrelated activities -1.62
(0.87)
† 
Subsidiary size 
 
-0.53
(0.20)
** 
Subsidiary integration 
 
0.30
(0.11)
** 
Deviation of expected demand growth from sample mean -0.71
(0.23)
** 
Host-government restrictions on acquisitions and incentives to choose greenfields -0.33
(0.10)
*** 
Lack of suitable acquisition targets 
 
0.24
(0.07)
*** 
Cultural distance 
 
0.51
(0.17)
** 
Intercept 
 
-1.62
(0.71)
* 
  
Model χ2 72.86*** 
Log likelihood -86.78 
Pseudo R2 0.34 
 
Notes: 
(1) N = 191; greenfield = 1; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) MNE’s level of diversification and Subsidiary size: logged to eliminate skewness of raw variables. 
(2) † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; two-tailed tests. 
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Table II. Key statistics by geographic region 
 
Region Number of 
subsidiaries 
Percentage 
greenfields 
Mean subsidiary 
performance 
Mean level of 
subsidiary integration 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg 19 36.8 4.16 2.96 
Northern Europe 13 23.1 4.49 2.79 
United Kingdom 
and Ireland 24 41.7 4.16 2.61 
Southern Europe 21 42.9 4.24 2.94 
Germanic 
countries 18 33.3 3.69 2.60 
Eastern Europe 32 65.6 4.30 2.96 
North America 24 16.7 4.08 2.87 
Latin America 11 72.7 4.48 2.79 
Asia 21 81.0 4.32 2.71 
Africa 5 80.0 5.27 2.61 
Australia 3 66.7 3.67 2.07 
Note: column highs and lows in bold. 
 
Table III. Key statistics by parent industry 
 
Industry Number of 
parents 
Percentage 
greenfields 
Mean subsidiary 
performance 
Mean level of 
subsidiary integration 
Agriculture and 
horticulture 4 40.0 5.27 3.14 
Food and beverages 12 35.3 4.50 2.34 
Machinery and 
electronics 11 50.0 4.21 3.12 
Wood and paper 
products 11 50.0 3.98 3.06 
Chemicals and 
synthetics 13 52.6 4.32 2.95 
Metal products 11 50.0 3.88 3.00 
Construction 3 25.0 3.67 2.69 
Other manufacturing 4 75.0 3.67 2.88 
Retail and wholesale 
trade 17 40.7 4.17 2.98 
Transportation, storage, 
and communication 10 66.7 4.28 2.97 
Financial services 14 57.1 4.05 2.18 
Professional services 18 39.3 4.39 2.88 
Other services 2 40.0 4.40 2.76 
Note: column highs and lows in bold. 
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Table IV. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Subsidiary performance 4.22 1.33            
2. Establishment mode (greenfield = 1) 0.48 0.50 -0.16           
3. Subsidiary integration 2.80 0.89 -0.16 0.23          
4. MNE’s international experience 2.08 1.00 0.09 -0.11 0.01         
5. MNE’s host-country experience 2.99 2.49 0.16 -0.18 -0.02 0.12        
6. Subsidiary performs related activities 0.13 0.33 0.06 -0.11 -0.29 -0.02 0.05       
7. Subsidiary performs unrelated activities 0.04 0.19 0.08 -0.13 -0.06 0.10 0.03 -0.07      
8. Subsidiary size 0.77 0.62 0.11 -0.24 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.12 -0.01     
9. Economic conditions 4.23 1.58 0.48 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.08    
10. Competition 4.47 1.45 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09   
11. Cultural distance 2.13 1.07 0.05 0.32 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.23  
12. Lambda 8.66E-09 0.67 -0.08 0.77 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 
Notes: 
(1) N = 191; correlations greater than or equal to |0.15| are significant at p < 0.05, while those greater than or equal to |0.23| are significant at p < 
0.01 (two-tailed). 
(2) MNE’s international experience and Subsidiary size: logged to eliminate skewness of raw variables. 
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Table V. Second-stage OLS regression estimates of the determinants of foreign subsidiary performance 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Establishment mode 
(greenfield = 1, acquisition = 0) 
-0.72
(0.43)
† -0.33
(0.45)
 -0.33
(0.44)
  
Establishment mode reverse coded 
(greenfield = 0, acquisition = 1) 
   0.33
(0.44)
 
Lambda 
 
0.27
(0.28)
 0.04
(0.28)
 0.06
(0.28)
 0.06
(0.28)
 
Subsidiary integration 
 
 -0.26
(0.12)
* -0.45
(0.13)
*** -0.04
(0.18)
 
Subsidiary integration x Establishment mode   0.41
(0.20)
*  
Subsidiary integration x Establishment mode 
reverse coded 
   -0.41
(0.20)
* 
MNE’s international experience 
 
0.04
(0.09)
 0.06
(0.09)
 0.07
(0.09)
 0.07
(0.09)
 
MNE’s host-country experience 
 
0.04
(0.04)
 0.05
(0.04)
 0.05
(0.04)
 0.05
(0.04)
 
Subsidiary performs related activities 0.34
(0.26)
 0.19
(0.26)
 0.15
(0.26)
 0.15
(0.26)
 
Subsidiary performs unrelated activities 0.09
(0.31)
 0.08
(0.31)
 0.06
(0.31)
 0.06
(0.31)
 
Subsidiary size -0.003
(0.18)
 0.02
(0.18)
 0.03
(0.18)
 0.03
(0.18)
 
Economic conditions 
 
0.44
(0.06)
*** 0.44
(0.06)
*** 0.44
(0.06)
*** 0.44
(0.06)
*** 
Competition 
 
-0.04
(0.07)
 -0.06
(0.07)
 -0.05
(0.07)
 -0.05
(0.07)
 
Cultural distance 
 
0.20
(0.11)
† 0.14
(0.11)
 0.13
(0.10)
 0.13
(0.10)
 
Intercept 
 
3.44
(0.77)
*** 4.15
(0.80)
*** 3.33
(0.70)
*** 3.00
(0.70)
*** 
Industry dummies significant at p < 0.05 7 10 8 8 
     
R2 0.357 0.377 0.393 0.393 
F-value of model 5.05*** 5.97*** 6.15*** 6.15*** 
F-test of additional variable  4.55* 4.37* 4.37* 
 
Notes: 
(1) N = 191; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) MNE’s international experience and Subsidiary size: logged to eliminate skewness of raw variables. 
(3) † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between the level of subsidiary integration and the conformity costs incurred 
by greenfields and acquisitions 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) As explained earlier, the external conformity costs of acquisitions are assumed to be zero because acquisitions are 
going concerns. 
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Figure 2. Impact of subsidiary integration on the performance of greenfields and acquisitions 
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